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CONTROVERSY OVER THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: SHOULD THE CRIMINAL GO FREE
IF THE CONSTABLE BLUNDERS?
Although courts should not condone unconstitutional behav-
ior on the part of government agents, this does not command
the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality; rather, the
applicable principles must be weighed against the considera-
ble harm that would flow from indiscriminate application of
the exclusionary rule.1
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that every individual shall be protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures.2 Notwithstanding the text of the Fourth
Amendment, the homes, papers, and effects of citizens are rou-
tinely invaded.3 On those occasions where the intrusion is unwar-
ranted, no provision in the Constitution grants a remedy.4 The
Supreme Court, therefore, created the exclusionary rule in order
to deter unconstitutional searches and seizures.5 The exclusionary
1 United States v. Paynor, 447 U.S. 727, 727 (1980) (Powell, J.).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
(Tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
3 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), overruled by Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Boyd Court stated:
[Bireaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggrava-
tion; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of man's own testimony or his private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within
the condemnation ... [of those Amendments].
Id.; see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,389 (1987) (search of motor home); T.L.O. v.
New Jersey, 469 U.S. 325, 331 (1985) (search of high school student's purse); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (seizure of defendant's luggage for 90 minutes outweighs
law enforcement concerns); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (search of
person's cigarette packet arrested for driving without valid driver's license).
4 See Milton A. Lowenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49
UMKC L. REV. 24, 25 (1980). The Fourth Amendment contains neither an express nor im-
plied provision for excluding illegally seized evidence and the Supreme Court created the
exclusionary rule as a mechanism for enforcing this amendment. Id. at 24; see also infra
note 5 (discussing exclusionary rule as remedy designed to protect Fourth Amendment
rights).
5 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1973). The exclusionary rule is a
judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights by deterring
illegal police conduct, rather than a personal constitutional right for the party aggrieved.
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rule requires that evidence recovered, as the result of an illegal
search, be excluded at trial.
Since its inception, the exclusionary rule has engendered con-
siderable controversy.7 It was hoped that the exclusionary rule
would deter future unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement
officers, by eliminating the use of illegally obtained evidence at
trial.' Recently, the controversy has been whether the exclusion-
ary rule achieves its objective of deterring police misconduct, or
Id.; see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (prime purpose of exclusionary rule is
to deter future unlawful police conduct); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)
(exclusionary rule operates as judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights through deterrent effect); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542
(1975) (purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) ("with the exclusionary rule the court hopes to instill in
those investigating officers, a greater degree of care towards rights of accused"); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ('Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it."); Weeks v. United States, 323 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) ("conviction by means of
unlawful seizures and enforced confessions... should find no sanction in the judgements of
the courts").
6 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-60. The Mapp Court explained that if evidence seized in
violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights could be used against him at trial,
then the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures would be of no value. Id.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was an essential part of the
Fourth Amendment and imposed the rule in the state court. Id.
7 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 (rule safeguards Fourth Amendment rights through
deterrent effect); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (rule's purpose to compel respect for Fourth
Amendment constitutional guarantees).
8 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (explaining possibility of hinder-
ing truth finding process); see also Donald L. Doernberg, The Right of the People: Recon-
ciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
259, 260 (1983). The author examines the tensions between the application of the exclu-
sionary rule and Fourth Amendment concerns, suggesting a standard to be used when de-
ciding to invoke the exclusionary rule. Id.; John E. Fennelly & Steven I Sharpe, Massa-
chusetts v. Shepard; When the Keeper Leads the Flock Astray-A Case of Good Faith or
Harmless Error?, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 665, 671 (1984). Courts and commentators have
stated that the exclusionary rule is an imprudent remedy which has failed its intended
purpose. Id. The exclusionary rule has also been said to undermine the truth-seeking pro-
cess. Id.; John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1029
(1973-74). The exclusionary rule makes inadmissible in a defendant's criminal prosecution
any evidence seized in violation of his constitutional rights. Id.; Dallin H. Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizures, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 736 (1970). The
possible negative effects of excluding evidence under the exclusionary rule include allowing
evidence competent to prove guilt to be excluded. Id.; Teresa J. Verges, Good Faith, Reason-
ableness-And the Lesson of Maryland v. Garrison: Know thy Neighbor, 38 DEPAUL L. REV.
517, 535 (1989). The author notes there is a great amount of debate over the exclusionary
rule in the legislature and suggests the possibility of the exclusionary rule becoming obso-
lete. Id. at 517; Phyllis T. Bookspan, Note, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resusci-
tating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 473 (1991). The Supreme Court has
struggled to balance the protection of the Fourth Amendment against the loss of incrimi-
nating evidence and conviction of the guilty. Id. This ongoing battle is evident in five spe-
cific developments of Fourth Amendment law: a narrowing definition of what constitutes a
search; standing thresholds; denial of federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment
violations; the expansion of exceptions to the warrant requirement; and a free form reason-
ableness analysis. Id.
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whether it unnecessarily suppresses valuable evidence that
causes criminals to go free.9
Part One of this Note traces the origins of the exclusionary rule
and reviews the minimum standards established by the Supreme
Court. Part Two examines how New York courts have inconsis-
tently applied the exclusionary rule and the detrimental effect
this has had on law enforcement's ability to predict what will be
permissive conduct. In addition, Part Two reviews how other
states have utilized the exclusionary rule more prudently. Lastly,
Part Three suggests reforms and proposals that provide a basis for
consistent application of the exclusionary rule.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The genesis of the exclusionary rule is traced to three early
cases. 10 Boyd v. United States,1 involved a forfeiture proceeding
where the government sought discovery of certain invoices in the
defendant's possession.1 2 The Supreme Court excluded evidence
which was obtained by an order of production, that compelled the
defendant to turn over the invoices.' 3 Although Boyd was a civil
case,' 4 and a search by police was not involved, the Court dis-
9 See supra note 5 (discussing exclusionary rule as safeguard of Fourth Amendment
rights); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-506 (1975) (exclusionary rule imposes
tremendous costs on society and does not protect judicial integrity or deter official miscon-
duct); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) ("there is no empiri-
cal evidence to support the claim that the rule actually deters illegal conduct of law enforce-
ment officials"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 491 (1971) ('[T]he assumed
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule has never been adequately demonstrated. .. ").
10 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (deciding private letters taken
from defendant's home violative of his Fourth Amendment right), overruled by Elkins, 364
U.S. at 206; Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904) (arguing action may exist
against officer's wrongful conduct, but should not be predicate for excluding evidence), over-
ruled by Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
638 (1886) (arguing district attorney's order to produce unconstitutional), overruled by El-
kins v. United States, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
11 116 U.S. 616 (1886), overruled by Elkins v. United States, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
12 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638. To prove fraud, the United States Attorney offered an order
directing the claimant to produce the invoice of the 29 cases of plate glass, in order to show
that defendant was attempting to evade the payment of import tax. Id.
13 Id. at 638. The Court stated that the United States Attorney's order to produce de-
fendant's invoices was unconstitutional and should be excluded because failure to produce
would lead to the equivalent of a confession, and that would be the same as ordering their
production. Id.
14 Id. at 617. The Boyd Court dealt with the seizure and forfeiture of property against 35
cases of plate glass. Id. Defendants altered invoices so as to defraud the government of
import tax. Id. Section 12 of the Act of June 22, 1874, entitled 'An Act to Amend Customs
Revenue Laws" declared that one 'shall for each offense be fined in any sum not exceeding
$5000 nor less than $50 .... " Id.
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cussed the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures."5 Justice Joseph P. Bradley declared that a
right to privacy existed in one's personal papers and documents, 16
and the steps taken to obtain the defendant's invoices were unrea-
sonable and violated his Fourth Amendment rights.17
Eighteen years after the Boyd decision, the Supreme Court
seemed to contradict itself in Adams v. New York.' 8 In Adams, the
defendant was convicted of possessing gambling paraphernalia,
after private papers were seized from his premises without his
consent.' 9 The Adams Court held that evidence, even if obtained
illegally, was effective to establish guilt regardless of its source.2 °
In Weeks v. United States,21 the Supreme Court re-established
15 Id. at 621-22. The Boyd Court stated:
[I]n regard to the Fourth Amendment, it is contended that, whatever might have been
alleged against the constitutionality of the acts of 1863 and 1867, that of 1874, under
which the order in the present case was made, is free from constitutional objection,
because it does not authorize the search and seizure of books and papers, but only
requires the defendant or claimant to produce them. That is so, but it declares that if
he does not produce them, the allegations which it is affirmed they will prove shall be
taken as confessed. This is tantamount to compelling their production .... It is our
opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish
a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
Id.
16 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Justice Joseph P. Bradley stated:
'any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to
be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods is within the condemna-
tion of that judgment." Id.
17 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622. The Boyd Court explained that compelling an individual to
produce private papers was within the ambit of Fourth Amendment protection. Id. Simi-
larly, to require the production of personal papers would be, in effect, compelling a person
to testify against himself. Id. at 633. The Court further explained, "inspection by the dis-
trict attorney of a said invoice... and its admission in evidence by the court, were errone-
ous and unconstitutional proceedings." Id. at 638.
18 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904), overruled by Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
The Court stated that it would not review whether the evidence was obtained lawfully or
unlawfully, rather the court would determine whether the evidence was competent to prove
guilt. Id.
19 Id. at 598 (defendant in possession of "record of chances," commonly known as "policy
slips").
20 Id. at 594. Justice William R. Day explained:
It may be mentioned in this place that though papers and other subjects of evidence
may have been illegally taken from the possession of the party against whom they are
offered or otherwise unlawfully obtained, this is no valid objection to their admis-
sability if they are pertinent to the issue. The court will not take notice how they were
obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue to determine that
question.
Id. at 594-95. Justice Day further explained that there was not any legal grounds for sus-
taining an objection to the admissibility of the evidence. Id. at 595. If the seizure was the
result of police misconduct, then a possible action lied against the officer and the evidence
would still be permitted. Id. If evidence was relevant to the issue, the court should not
inquire into its source. Id.
21 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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the exclusionary rule.22 In Weeks, the defendant was convicted of
illegal gambling.23 On appeal, the defendant argued that docu-
ments used as evidence in his trial were illegally obtained, and his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.24 The Court concluded
that the evidence was illegally obtained and had to be returned to
the defendant.2 5
Although the exclusionary rule mandated that illegally seized
evidence be returned,26 the rule did not address whether a defend-
ant could suppress the use of that evidence at trial. In
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,28 the defendant's office
22 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. The Weeks Court stated:
We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in question were taken from the
house of the accused by an official of the United States, acting under color of his office,
in direct violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant . . . [and] the court
should have restored these letters to the accused.... In holding them and permitting
their use upon trial, we think prejudicial error was committed.
Id.; see also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Develop-
ment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1365, 1374 (1983) (stating that 10 years later it became clear Adams was "just a wild turn
in the exclusionary rule roller coaster track").
23 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386. Police officers were led into defendant's house by a neighbor
and without a warrant. Id. The police searched the defendant's room and took possession of
various papers, including letters and stock certificates. Id.
24 Id. at 389. The defendant argued that the papers had been obtained by entering his
home without a search warrant and therefore violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights. Id. at 389-90.
25 Id. at 393. The Weeks Court explained that while the efforts of the courts and law
enforcement officials to bring the guilty to justice were praiseworthy, they could not be
accomplished at the expense of an individual's constitutional right. Id. The Court further
stated:
[I]f letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment, de-
claring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id.
26 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (arguing denial of constitutional
right by not complying with demand for return of illegally obtained evidence). See generally
Stewart, supra note 22, at 1372 (stating exclusion product of Fourth Amendment's man-
date that illegally seized evidence be returned).
27 See Stewart, supra note 22, at 1375; see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIzuRE, A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT § 1.1 (2d ed. 1987) (addressing that
Weeks Court saw no constitutional impediment to admitting in federal trial fruits of state
search); William C. Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 1989 Wis. L.
REV. 1193, 1201 (1989) (asserting exclusionary rule neither intended nor able to cure inva-
sion of defendant's rights which is critical to establishing claim that exclusion not required
by Fourth Amendment); Mary J. Morrison, Choice of Law for Unlawful Searches, 41 OKLA.
L. REv. 579, 586 (1988) (suppressing evidence on supervisory grounds as opposed to consti-
tutional grounds and result is Congress could replace rule with more flexible rule); Carolyn
A. Yagla, Comment, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: The Latest Exam-
ple of"New Federalism" in the States, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 166, 169 (1987) (explaining Wolf v.
Colorado interpreted Weeks v. United States as allowing states to utilize equally effective
remedy).
28 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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was searched, and books and papers were seized while the defend-
ants were detained at their residence. 29 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that a rule which prohibited a certain means of obtaining
evidence should also provide that such evidence not be used dur-
ing a trial.3 °
A. The Standard Established for States
In Wolf v. Colorado,31 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether state courts had to apply the exclusionary rule when
there was a Fourth Amendment violation.32 The Wolf Court held
that if a state could provide a remedy that would deter unconstitu-
tional police conduct, as equally effective as the exclusionary rule,
the exclusionary rule would not have to be utilized. 3 However,
the dissent argued that no other effective remedy existed. 34 Jus-
tice Frank Murphy stated that there was only one alternative to
the exclusionary rule, and that was, to have no sanction at all.35
In Mapp v. Ohio, 36 the Supreme Court finally mandated state
29 Id. at 390-91.
30 Id. at 392. The Silverthorne Court concluded that "[t]he essence of a provision forbid-
ding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Id. However, the
Court also stressed a limitation that if evidence was obtained by an independent source it
could be used. Id. However, if the evidence was gained by the government's own miscon-
duct, the evidence could not be used at trial. Id.; see also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 27 (1925). The Agnello Court took a substantial step forward in applying the exclusion-
ary rule to different types of evidence. Id. at 27-34. The defendant sought to suppress a
container of cocaine seized by revenue agents after a planned "sting" operation. Id. The
Court held a person may invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment, and demand the
return of the item seized where an illegal seizure occurred in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to the demand the return of the
cocaine, since allowing to be admitted would violate his Fifth Amendment right. Id.
31 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
32 See id. at 25. Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the majority, explained that the
issue was whether a state was required to exclude evidence under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because it obtained in manner that would have required it suppression in a federal
court under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 25-26.
33 Id. at 33. The Wolf Court stated: "We hold, therefore, that in a prosecution in a State
court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evi-
dence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. The Fourth Amendment never
expressed a remedy that must be applied. Id. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does
not require that states apply a remedy that the federal courts have chosen. Id. at 33-34.
34 Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Frank Murphy eloquently stated: "Imagina-
tion and zeal may invent a dozen methods to give content to the commands of the Fourth
Amendment. But this Court is limited to the remedies currently available. It cannot legis-
late the ideal system." Id.
35 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 41. Justice Murphy explained: "there is but one alternative to the
rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at all." Id.
36 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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application of the exclusionary rule.37 In Mapp, Dollree Mapp was
convicted of possessing obscene magazines and photographs after
police officers entered her home without a warrant.3 While the
Supreme Court of Ohio admitted the illegally seized evidence,39
the Supreme Court of the United States mandated that the evi-
dence be excluded from trial.40 The Supreme Court explained that
the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy was enforceable against
the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore an
implied remedy had been forged for Fourth Amendment
violations.4 1
Since the Mapp decision, the Supreme Court has established ex-
ceptions to the exclusionary rule.42 For instance, in United States
v. Calandra,4 3 the Supreme Court explained that a witness sum-
moned to appear before a grand jury could not decline to answer
questions on the basis that his identity was the evidence obtained
37 Id. at 660. Writing for the majority, Justice Tom C. Clark stated:
[Olur decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that
which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and to the courts, that judicial integrity so neces-
sary in the true administration of justice.
Id.; see also Michael Flannery, Note, Abridged Too Far: Anticipatory Search Warrants and
the Fourth Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 789 (1991) (extending exclusionary
rule to states perpetuates principles of humanity and civil liberty); Sarah E. Rosenberg,
Comment, Buie Signals: Has an Arrest Warrant Become a License to Fish in Private Wa-
ters?, 41 EMORY L.J. 321, 325 (1992) (application of exclusionary to states through Four-
teenth Amendment imposes reasonableness standard on all government activity).
38 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644. Police officers responded to a tip that a person, who was
wanted for questioning in a recent bombing, was hiding out at a certain location. Id. When
the officers sought entrance to the house, Ms. Mapp refused. Id. The officers advised head-
quarters and began surveillance. Id. The officers, after being joined by more officers, forced
themselves in and gained entry. Id.
39 Id. at 645-46. The state court explained that even if the evidence was obtained unlaw-
fully, the Fourteenth Amendment did not mandate that the evidence be excluded at trial in
light of the Wolf decision. Id.
40 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. Just as the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, so is any judicially created remedy for the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
41 Id. at 654; see also State v. Diaz, 628 A.2d 567, 576 (Conn. 1993). The Diaz court
explained that prior to Mapp, neither Connecticut's practice book, nor their statutes con-
tained any express provision for suppression of evidence. Id.; State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d
502, 510 (N.C. 1992) (exclusion of illegally seized evidence in state courts essential to due
process as matter of constitutionality); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 892 (Pa.
1991) (exclusion of illegally seized evidence part and parcel of Fourth Amendment guaran-
tee); Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 915 (Tex. 1990) (holding exclusionary rule applicable
to state prosecutions with same probable cause standards applicable to federal and state
warrants); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 185 (Utah 1987) (requiring suppression of evi-
dence seized pursuant to search or seizure made in violation of Fourth Amendment).
42 See infra notes 43-46 (discussing exceptions to exclusionary rule).
43 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
202 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 9:195
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.44 In addition, in Wong Sun
v. United States,45 the Supreme Court explained that evidence ob-
tained in a manner so attenuated from a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation would not be subject to the exclusionary rule.46
II. NEW YoRK's APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Although a state may afford a defendant greater rights and pro-
tection under its own constitution than the United States
Supreme Court has bestowed under the Federal Constitution,4 7
44 Id. at 340-41. A warrant was issued in connection with an extensive investigation of
suspected illegal gambling operations, for the purpose of searching for the location of gam-
bling books. Id. While the search of defendant's place of business revealed no gambling
books, FBI agents recovered promissory notes indicating payments to John Calandra. Id.
The agents contacted the United States Attorney's office for the Northern District of Ohio,
regarding the possibility of extortionate credit transactions. Id. A grand jury subpoenaed
Calandra for questioning. Id. Mr. Calandra appeared, and refused to testify, invoking his
Fifth Amendment right. Id.; see also People v. Young, 55 N.Y.2d 419, 424, 434 N.E.2d 1068,
1071, 449 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704 (1982) (acknowledging exclusionary rule never interpreted to
preclude use of all illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons); People
v. Pleasant, 76 A.D.2d 244, 246, 430 N.Y.S.2d 592, 593 (1st Dep't 1980) (explaining exclu-
sionary rule not extended to grand jury proceedings or evidence used to impeach defend-
ant); Rosado v. McGuire, 114 Misc. 2d 652, 656, 452 N.Y.S.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. County Ct.
1982) (court refused to extend exclusionary rule to Fourth Amendment challenges to grandjury witness's questions and subpoenas); People v. McGrath, 86 Misc. 2d 249, 255, 380
N.Y.S.2d 976, 983 (N.Y. County Ct. 1976) (stating there was no right to immediate suppres-
sion hearing for grand jury witness who refused to answer questions based on Fourth
Amendment violation).
45 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
46 Id. at 491. Wong Sun gave an unsigned confession after he was arrested for violations
of federal narcotics laws. Id. The arrest lacked probable cause, and the Supreme Court
declared the confession attenuated, and therefore admissible, because Wong Sun had vol-
untarily returned several days later to make the statement. Id.; see also People v. Towns,
41 N.Y.2d 97, 102, 359 N.E.2d 402, 406, 390 N.Y.S.2d 893, 897 (1976) (pulling and firing
gun at police officer render any connection between unlawful conduct and discovery of evi-
dence attenuated); People v. Gluckowski, 174 A.D.2d 752, 753, 571 N.Y.S.2d 336, 337 (2d
Dep't 1991) (videotaped statement in which defendant admitted to punching and stabbing
girlfriend was attenuated because given voluntarily and after being read Miranda warn-
ings); cf People v. Figueroa, 122 Misc. 2d 631, 634, 471 N.Y.S.2d 986, 988 (N.Y. County Ct.
1984) (line-up immediately following warrantless arrest not attenuated to allow admission
at trial).
47 See People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308, 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). The Sundling
court stated that under the Michigan and United States constitutions, illegally seized evi-
dence generally must be suppressed. Id. at 313. In this case, the court stated that although
the United States Supreme Court had adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, the Michigan courts would not. Id. The court held that it was a state's right to give a
defendant greater rights under its own constitution than the United States Supreme Court
had given under the United States Constitution. Id. at 314; see also United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 340 (1974). The Calandra Court held "the exclusionary rule should be
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are.., most efficaciously served." Id.
For lower courts which have interpreted this holding expansively, not allowing the use of
any illegally seized evidence in any criminal proceeding, see United States v Graves, 758
F.2d 870, 874 (10th Cir. 1986) (illegally obtained evidence not allowed at sentencing hear-
ing); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 1970) (illegally obtained evidence not
allowed at probation hearings); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1165 (2d Cir.
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New York has not always chosen to apply the exclusionary rule
exceptions espoused by the Supreme Court.48 In People v. Rog-
ers,49 the New York Court of Appeals held that the exclusionary
rule would only be applied if the challenged evidence was closely
tied to the illegal arrest. 0 The Court of Appeals admitted the evi-
dence, since the relation of the police conduct to the evidence, was
so insignificant that suppressing the evidence was no longer
justified.5 '
In People v. Johnson,52 the defendant gave two voluntary state-
ments regarding his arrest for murder after he had been given his
Miranda warnings.5 3  The Court of Appeals explained that
1970) (illegally obtained evidence not allowed at parole revocation hearing); People v.
Smith, 360 N.w.2d 841, 842 n.2 (Mich. 1984). The Smith court held that there were no
policy decisions that command the use of a test proffered by the Supreme Court over one
set out by the state. Id. "It is true that this court cannot interpret a similar provision in the
Michigan constitution less liberally than the United States Supreme Court interprets the
United States Constitution, but the opposite is true." Id.
48 See People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 299, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941
(1993) ("reaching into defendant's pocket is beyond the degree of intrusion authorized
under Terry v. Ohio"); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 488 N.E.2d 451, 454, 497
N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 (1985) (declining to adopt good faith exception on belief cost outweigh
benefit).
49 52 N.Y.2d 527, 421 N.E.2d 491, 439 N.Y.S.2d 96, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981).
50 Id. at 532, 421 N.E.2d at 496, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 100. In Rogers, the defendant was
convicted of felony murder. Id. The victim, a woman, was stabbed in the throat and abdo-
men, dragged along the sidewalk, and into an alleyway where, while dying, she was raped.
Id. The primary issue of the case was whether admissions made by the defendant to the
police following his arrest, which lacked probable cause, were properly admitted into evi-
dence. Id. at 530, 421 N.E.2d at 493, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
Even though, at the trial, there was overwhelming evidence of the guilt of defendant,
because of confessions he made after his arrest, the information the police possessed at the
time the defendant was arrested did not constitute probable cause for arrest. Although
improper, the court held the arrest was designed to hold the defendant, and after admis-
sions were made by the defendant, the detention was supported by probable cause. Id. at
534, 421 N.E.2d at 497, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 101; see also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341 (1939). The Nardone Court held that facts improperly obtained would not "be-
come sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source
they may be proved like others, but the knowledge gained by the courts own wrong cannot
be used by it simply because it is used derivatively.'" Id. (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 471 (1963). In Wong Sun, the Court stated that at some point the chain of causation is
broken and the original illegal activity did not barr the admission of evidence obtained
thereafter. Id. at 471.
51 Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d at 532, 421 N.E.2d at 496, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 100. The Rogers court
also held that the evidence challenged was the product of a source independent of the de-
fendant's detention, and concluded that the police did not exploit the illegal detention of
defendant to produce his incriminating statements. Id.; see also Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at
392 (challenged evidence product of independent source and police did not exploit illegal
detention); People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662, 670, 339 N.E.2d 162, 167, 376 N.Y.S.2d 469,
474 (1975) (focusing on reasonableness of factual basis for police action and motive at root
of action when evaluating propriety of police conduct).
52 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985).
53 Id. at 399, 488 N.E.2d at 441, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 619. Defendant was convicted of felony
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although the defendant was illegally arrested, the prosecution
could prove that statements made were acquired by means suffi-
ciently distinguishable from the illegal arrest, and therefore ad-
missible despite the illegality of the arrest.5 4 The court held that
the relevant consideration was whether an intervening event
broke the causal connection between the arrest and the defend-
ant's statements.55 Intervening events include the temporal prox-
imity of the arrest and confession, and the purpose and flagrancy
of the official misconduct. 56 Because, in this case, the prosecution
failed to prove that an intervening event purged the taint of ille-
gality, the court granted the motion to suppress.5 7
A. New York's Inconsistent Application of the Exclusionary
Rule
New York courts are unpredictable in their application of the
exclusionary rule.5" In New York v. Harris,5 e the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the New York Court of Appeals incor-
murder and related crimes arising from the slaying of a store owner during a robbery. Id. at
399, 488 N.E.2d at 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 619. The defendant claimed that two statements
he made after his arrest were improperly received into evidence because he was arrested
without probable cause, and the statements he made were products of his unlawful arrest.
Id. at 400, 488 N.E.2d at 441, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
54 Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624. In Johnson the
defendant was arrested unlawfully when police acted solely upon hearsay information
given to them by another suspect. Id. The Johnson court held that the defendant's state-
ments made after his illegal arrest were tainted by the arrest, and since the arrest was not
purged by any intervening event, the evidence was suppressed. Id.
55 Id. at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624. The court explained that the rele-
vant considerations were "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the
presence of intervening circumstances ... and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct." Id. at 409, 488 N.E.2d at 448, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (citing Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)); see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 689-92
(1982) ("a confession obtained through interrogation after an illegal arrest, should be ex-
cluded unless intervening events break the connection so that the confession is an act of
free will, no longer part of the primary illegality"); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
216-19 (1971) (defendant seized without probable cause and statements made during ille-
gal detention not sufficiently attenuated to permit use at trial).
56 Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 407, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
57 People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 406, 488 N.E.2d 439, 447, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 626
(1985).
58 See People v. Sierra, 190 A.D.2d 202, 206, 599 N.Y.S.2d 6, 8 (1st Dep't 1993) (judges
and lawyers disagree when confronted with specific cases about what circumstances give
rise to sufficient suspicion tojustify pursuit of suspect); People v. Rivera, 175 A.D.2d 78,80,
572 N.Y.S.2d 327, 330 (1st Dep't 1991) (officer's pursuit of defendant justified after officer
observed hand movements between defendant and another man, and defendant immedi-
ately ran upon officer's approach). But see People v. Holmes, 181 A.D.2d 27, 30, 585
N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (1st Dep't 1992) (police officer's observation of defendant, in known drug
location, with bulge in pocket, and defendant's flight upon officer's attempt to question him
not justify pursuit of defendant).
59 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
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rectly suppressed the defendant's confession made at a police pre-
cinct.60 The Supreme Court held that although the police arrested
the defendant without a warrant, probable cause existed because
of various facts the police obtained, including the body of the vic-
tim.6 ' The exclusionary rule, therefore, did not bar the use of the
defendant's statement.62 On remand, the Court of Appeals re-
jected the Supreme Court's analysis and suppressed the state-
ment.63 The Court of Appeals explained that although admissible
under federal standards, the defendant's statement would be sup-
pressed under New York law because the evidence was obtained
from illegal entry of defendant's dwelling.64
The Court of Appeals in Harris was incorrect in suppressing the
confession made at the precinct. Although citizens must be af-
forded protection from illegal police conduct, Harris had already
received this protection when the statement he made in his home
to the police was suppressed.65 The Harris decision was an exces-
sive use of the exclusionary rule because there was no police mis-
conduct. Particularly, the defendant was read his Miranda rights
on several occasions, and an hour passed after he was brought to
the precinct and confessed a second time.66 The Harris decision,
60 Id. at 21-22; see also People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1055, 568
N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (1990). In Harris, police went to the defendant's apartment in search of
him and after they knocked on the door and identified themselves, the defendant let the
police into his apartment. Id. at 439, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706. While drink-
ing wine, he told police he killed his girlfriend. Id. An hour later at the precinct, after being
given his Miranda rights, the defendant confessed for a second time. Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d
at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707. The court suppressed his first statement, under Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), because defendant was arrested without a warrant. Id.
The rule espoused in Payton v. New York, protected against warrantless arrests in a
person's dwelling. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 575. The Payton rule is that a warrantless entry
will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home if
police have effected a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order
to make an arrest. Id.
61 Harris, 495 U.S. at 21.
62 Id. at 21. The police had probable cause, developed during the five days between the
crime and the arrest. Id.; see also People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 446, 570 N.E.2d 1051,
1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 710 (1991). The trial court in New York found at the suppression
hearing that "the police station statement was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the
taint of the unlawful invasion." Id. The court further held that the "taint resulting from an
illegal arrest was removed by the lapse of time between the statements and the rereading
of the Miranda warnings." Id.
63 Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 443, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
64 Id. at 437, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705. The Court of Appeals suggested
that the Supreme Court's rule did not adequately protect the rights of citizens of New York.
Id.
65 Id. at 439, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (arguing Fourth Amendment right
already protected and any other exclusion unnecessary).
66 Id.
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therefore, complicates the ability of the police to detect and appre-
hend criminals because although the attenuation element had
been satisfied,67 the court still suppressed the evidence. The con-
fusion that has plagued the New York courts is also evident in
People v. Oeller68 and People v. Peguero.6 9
In People v. Oeller, two police officers observed the defendant
purchase what appeared to be illegal narcotics. 70 The officers ap-
proached the defendant, and ordered him to take his hands out of
his pockets. 7 ' Upon doing so, several vials of crack cocaine fell to
the ground.72 The New York State Appellate Division, First De-
partment, upheld the trial court's decision not to suppress the evi-
dence. 73 Because the defendant was observed in an area known
67 See People v. Sierra, 190 A.D.2d 202, 204, 599 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (1st Dep't 1993). The
Sierra court held that a defendant's flight, coupled with an officer's prior belief that crimi-
nal activity was afoot, was sufficient to provide the officers with justification to pursue and
detain the fleeing individual. Id. The court stated: "this analysis comports with the reality
of these rapidly escalating street encounters. Holding to the contrary merely serves to frus-
trate effective law enforcement without providing any greater level of protection to the
citizenry, against unlawful intrusions upon their privacy." Id. at 208, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
Under the exclusionary rule, courts are called upon to evaluate the propriety of police
officer conduct in their approach, pursuit, and arrest of individuals they suspect are in-
volved in criminal activity. See supra note 5 (discussing purpose of exclusionary rule); see
also People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 215, 352 N.E.2d 562, 568, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379
(1976). The DeBour court established a four-tier method for evaluating the propriety of an
encounter initiated by a police officer. Id. The four-tier method included: (1) the police of-
ficer's right to request information of individuals must be supported by an objective, credi-
ble reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality; (2) the police officer's right to inquire
which is "activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits some-
what greater intrusion"; (3) where the officer believes that a person has committed, is
about to commit, or is involved in a crime, the officer is authorized to forcibly stop and
detain that person; and (4) if the police officer has probable cause to believe that a person
has committed a crime, an arrest is authorized. Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d
at 386.
However for criticism of DeBour, see People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 183, 590 N.E.2d
204,206, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (1992). The Hollman court commented on the DeBour stan-
dards: "[B]ecause the terms on their face are so close in meaning, the legal significance we
intended each to have has become obscured and the result has been inconsistency in the
evaluation of markedly similar police encounters." Id. at 185, 590 N.E.2d at 209, 501
N.Y.S.2d at 622; see also Sierra, 190 A.D.2d at 204, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (stating strict appli-
cation of DeBour principles generated discussion by fostering unrealistic approach to rap-
idly escalating street encounters).
68 191 A.D.2d 355, 595 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1993).
69 N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1993, at 21, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Crim. T. 1993).
70 Oeller, 191 A.D.2d at 356, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 193. The police officer testified that in 4
years of service, he had made 25 arrests, and assisted in over 100 others, involving illegal
narcotics in the location where defendant was arrested. Id.
71 Id. The officer believed the defendant was in possession of narcotics and therefore
ordered him to remove his hands from his pockets. Id.
72 Id. at 356, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
73 Id. at 357, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 194. The court held that police had more than "a founded
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot." Id. (citing People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210,
215, 352 N.E.2d 562, 568, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (1976)).
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for drug activity, and the officers had observed the defendant ex-
change money for an item, reasonable suspicion existed that the
defendant committed a crime.74
In People v. Peguero7 police officers observed what was be-
lieved to be a drug transaction. 76 When the defendant saw the po-
lice officers approach, he ran and threw seven vials of crack co-
caine to the ground.77 At the suppression hearing, the police
officers testified that they observed the defendant in the same
area on ten prior occasions, and several unidentified informants
told them that the defendant sold drugs.78
Although the facts were similar to Oeller, the Peguero court sup-
pressed the evidence because the police officers did not have the
requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to pursue and stop the
defendant.79 If factors indicative of criminality are present, a New
York court should not suppress the evidence discovered.80 In Oel-
ler and Peguero, factors indicative of criminality including, a
known drug area; a witnessed exchange of an item for money; and
the nervous reaction of the defendants when approached by police,
existed.8 ' Using a common-sense appraisal of the entire circum-
74 People v. Oeller, 191 A.D.2d 355, 356, 595 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (1993). The court ex-
plained the police had heightened suspicion when the other participant in the drug trans-
action ran while they approached and there was an exchange of money for an object "in an
area rampant with narcotics activity." Id. at 358, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
75 N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1993, at 21, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Crim. T. 1993).
76 Id. The police officer observed the defendant facing another individual and noticed
them "making movements" amongst themselves. Id. The officer then observed the defend-
ant accept money from the other individual. Id.
77 Id. The court held that the flight of the defendant served to heighten police suspicion.
Id. This, combined with the exchange of currency for an object "in an area rampant with
narcotics activity .... negated all but the most implausible explanations for the transac-
tion." Id.
78 Id. An unspecified number of unidentified individuals stated to police that defendant
had told them "he also sells." Id.
79 Id. The court concluded that at the time the defendant fled, the officer did not have
the requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to pursue and stop him. Id. The court held
that the drugs that the defendant threw away during the case must be suppressed because
they were "discarded as a spontaneous reaction to the sudden and unexpected pursuit by
the officers and not as an independent act, involving a calculated risk attenuated from the
underlying police conduct." Id. (quoting People v. Holmes, 181 A.D.2d 27, 29, 585 N.Y.S.2d
718, 720 (1st Dep't 1992)).
80 See, e.g., People v. Laws, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1993, at 21, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Crim. T.
1993). Factors indicative of criminality included rented car with out-of-state plates, double
parked, in location known for sale of narcotics to out-of-state residents. Id. Police checked
defendant's license after a traffic infraction and discovered a marijuana cigarette and a
nine millimeter pistol became visible. Id.; see also People v. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d 527, 535, 421
N.E.2d 491, 494, 439 N.Y.S.2d 96, 99 (1981) (court held common sense appraisal of entire
circumstances necessary when determining whether exclusionary rule applies).
81 See supra notes 74 & 76 (discussing factors present and indicative of criminality).
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stances, these factors establish reasonable suspicion. If New York
courts consistently applied these factors indicative of criminality,
police officers would be certain of permissible search and seizure
conduct.8 2
B. Other States' Application of the Exclusionary Rule
New York should follow a more conservative application of the
exclusionary rule, which has been established by several states.
8 3
In State v. Harper,4 the Tennessee Supreme Court denied a mo-
tion to suppress evidence.8 5 The Harper court held that the total-
ity of the circumstances provided police reasonable suspicion to
search the defendants' automobile.8 6 The police officers had con-
ducted a long-term drug investigation at the house where the de-
fendants were arrested.87 The police, through routine investiga-
tion, knew that drugs were being brought to the house by out-of-
state residents.8 8 These factors, therefore, establish the reason-
able suspicion which supported the police officer's actions.
In State v. Ostroski, 9 the Connecticut Supreme Court denied a
motion to suppress a confession.9" The defendant was arrested
without probable cause, but confessed to stabbing to death a
82 See William C. Hefferman & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MIcH. J.L. REF.
311, 356 (1991). Exclusion provides officers with day-to-day reminder of the importance of
adherence to the law. Id.; see also United States v. Paynor, 447 U.S. 727, 727 (1980). The
Paynor Court held that although courts should not condone unconstitutional behavior on
the part of government agents, the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality is an
incorrect rule. Id. The Court explained that "the applicable principles must be weighed
against the considerable harm that would come from an indiscriminate application of the
exclusionary rule." Id.; People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 190, 590 N.E.2d 204, 209, 581
N.Y.S.2d 619 (1992). The court noted that the tone of police encounters with civilians may
be subtle and "suspicion can grow based on intangibles evident only to the eyes of a trained
police officer." Id. The court also stated, "undercover officers develop a familiarity with
their terrain and would likely be sensitive to behavior that a less schooled onlooker would
dismiss as trivial." Id.
83 See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (discussing conservative decisions re-
garding reasonable suspicion and other factors indicative of criminality).
84 No. 87-215-II, 1988 WL 87668, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 1988).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. (investigating defendant's residence for approximately four and one-half months
for suspected illegal-narcotics activity).
88 Id. The court stated: "[iut is only unreasonable searches and seizure that are prohib-
ited by the state or federal constitutions .... Id. The court also explained that "all of the
surrounding circumstances must be taken into account to determine the reasonableness of
the conduct of police and the application of the exclusionary rule." Id.
89 518 A.2d 915 (Conn. 1986).
90 Id. at 926.
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nineteen-year-old woman after being interrogated. 91 He was then
convicted for murder based on the confession, and evidence ob-
tained by the illegal interrogation.92 The court held that the de-
fendant's confession was sufficiently attenuated from the primary
illegality.9 3 The court explained that thirty-six hours had passed
between the illegal arrest and the confession.94 This attenuation,
combined with the fact that police did not pressure the defendant
into confessing, were sufficient intervening events that broke the
causal connection, and removed the taint of illegality from the ini-
tial Fourth Amendment violation.95
III. EXCEPTIONS AND REFORMS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
New York's inconsistent and excessive application of the exclu-
sionary rule exemplifies the need for judicial modification. 96 New
York courts must provide a consistent standard for application of
the exclusionary rule. Such a standard must ensure that Fourth
Amendment rights are not infringed upon, that public safety is
protected, and that the truth-finding process is enhanced. Several
applications have been used which would strengthen New York's
exclusionary rule.97
91 Id. at 921. The court held that the inquiry turned on the application of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine. This doctrine rests on the theory that once there is police miscon-
duct, evidence that is obtained as a result of this conduct is tainted and should be barred
from use. Id. The Ostroski court explained that the evidence was admissible because it was
sufficiently attenuated from the primary illegality. Id. at 922.
92 Id. at 916. The defendant was charged with the murder of a 19-year-old woman. Id.
93 Id. at 922. The court explained that the following factors would be used to ascertain
whether the confession was obtained by the exploitation of the illegal arrest: the "temporal
proximity" of the illegality and the challenged evidence; "the presence of intervening cir-
cumstances"; and "particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Id. at
922 (quoting Brown v Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)).
94 Ostroski, 518 A.2d at 919.
95 Id. at 922.
96 See, e.g., Charles D. Levine, The Second Circuit Constricts the Applicability of the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 799, 821 (1986); Keith A. Fabi, Comment, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: Not the "Expressed Juice of the Wolly-Headed Thistle", 35 BUFF. L. REV. 937,
944 (1986). The sole remaining justification for the exclusionary rule is to act as a deterrent
against police misconduct. Id. The author postulated that the best mechanism for accom-
plishing this goal would be to set up statutory exclusionary rules which would establish a
bright-line rule and minimize judicial discretion. Id. In Tirado v. Commissioner, 460 U.S.
1014 (1983), the Second Circuit allowed the IRS to use evidence, illegally obtained by local
law enforcement officials, which was excluded at an earlier trial. Id. The decision was
based on the premise that the two agencies were so distant that the purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule, to deter police misconduct, was furthered, and therefore, not necessary. Id.
97 See infra notes 102 & 123 and accompanying text (discussing plain touch doctrine as
corollary of established plain view doctrine and revised reasonable suspicion definition).
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A. The Plain Touch Doctrine
A Fourth Amendment violation occurs when evidence is ob-
tained by an officer performing a search without a warrant or
probable cause.98 A warrantless search is per se unreasonable and
violates the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasona-
ble search and seizures.99 However, there are exceptions which al-
low for a warrantless search. 10 0 These exceptions range from a
search and seizure incident to arrest to evidence in plain view. 10
This latter exception has led commentators to suggest the applica-
98 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). Any conduct by an officer who forcefully
extorts a man's private papers or testimony is within the condemnation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (seizure of per-
sonal property per se unreasonable unless accomplished pursuit to judicial warrant); Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980). The Court explained that many courts and
commentators had argued that the Fourth Amendment was drafted in response to the
"general warrant," which was a one or two line warrant granting broad power. Id. The
Payton Court further explained that the "evil" the Fourth Amendment was designed to
prevent was much broader than the general warrant, and was to encompass situations
when no warrant existed. Id.; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 1 (1977) (fundamen-
tal purpose of Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable govern-
ment intrusions).
99 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). The petitioner was convicted of
transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of federal statute. Id. The is-
sue addressed was whether a telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area. Id.
Although, the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment protected people and not places,
the Court concluded that any search without a warrant was unlawful. Id. at 357.
100 See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Section 12 provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.; see also N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12 commentary (McKinney 1993). The commentary pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
[E]xceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for search include, consensual searches,
seizure of contraband and evidence of crime in plain view, search and seizure incident
to arrest, search and seizure of property lawfully in possession of police based on prob-
able cause or for safeguarding of property, and search and seizure of automobile based
on exigency provided there is probable cause.
Id.; see also People v. King, 193 A.D.2d 1075, 1075, 598 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (4th Dep't 1993)
(search of defendant's automobile was valid because police lawfully arrested defendant af-
ter chase); People v. Suarez, 187 A.D.2d 620, 620, 589 N.Y.S.2d 930, 931 (2d Dep't 1992)
(discovery of gun while frisking defendant after apprehended for operating stolen vehicle;
because discovery was incident to arrest, no warrant required); People v. Williams, 181
A.D.2d 474, 475, 581 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1st Dep't 1992) (exigent circumstances, such as open
door and officers arriving with victim, justified warrantless search of apartment where
rape had just occurred).
101 See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1473-74 (1985). The author states:
[T]here are over twenty exceptions to the probable cause or the warrant requirement
or both. They include searches incident to arrest, which are exceptions to both probable
cause and a warrant, to airport searches, which are also exceptions to both a warrant
and probable cause.
Id.; see also supra note 100 (discussing exceptions to exclusionary rule such as plain view,
exigent circumstances, and automobile searches).
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tion of the plain touch doctrine as an extension of plain view. 10 2
In United States v. Williams,10 3 the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a plain touch ex-
ception would exist as an extension of the plain view doctrine. 10 4
The plain touch doctrine provides that evidence, which can be dis-
cerned with reasonable certainty by an officer's legal touching,
would not be subject to a warrant requirement. 105 The plain touch
doctrine is supported by two theories. First, the intrusion into
one's privacy by a brief touch is a de minimis cost as compared to
the benefit.'0 6 The second theory maintains that probable cause
arises once there has been a lawful touching, and an officer un-
equivocally determines that contraband is present. 10 7
102 See David L. Haselkorn, The Case Against the Plain Feel Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, 54 U. CHI. L. REV 683, 685 (1987) (examining relationship between plain view
exception and plain feel exception); Larry E. Holtz, The "Plain Touch" Corollary: A Natural
and Foreseeable Consequence of the Plain View Doctrine, 95 DIcK. L. REV. 521, 539 (1991)
(plain touch clearly necessary and appropriate corollary to plain view doctrine); Katherine
Welbaum Iverson, "Plain Feel": A Common Sense Proposal Following State v. Dickerson, 16
HAMLINE L. REV. 247, 256 (1992) (plain feel proposal consonant with current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence supporting long-recognized plain view exception).
103 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
104 Id. at 1184. The Williams court explained: "[iun light of this authority, we endorse
even more strongly our earlier conclusion in Russell, that no warrant is needed for an open-
ing of a container whose contents become known through a lawful touching of the outside."
Id.; see also United States v. Russel, 670 F.2d 323, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (plain view excep-
tion encompasses plain touch and probably plain smell, based on idea that incriminating
contents immediately apparent); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 428 (2d Cir. 1981)
(where contents of container are easily discernible, expectation of privacy slight); Walker
v. State, 610 A.2d 728, 728 (Del. 1992) (seizure of cocaine from defendant's pocket within
scope of search because officers concluded with reasonable certainty that pocket contained
contraband).
105 See Williams, 822 F.2d at 1184 (seizure of paper bag containing controlled substance
is justified after defendant attempted to conceal it and officers were able to discern con-
tents with reasonable certainty); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir.
1980) (because contents of paper bag were apparent from outward feel of container, appel-
lants did not possess reasonable expectation of privacy in paper bag); see also supra note
104 (discussing situations where contents of containers discernable with reasonable
certainty).
106 See supra note 102 (noting that courts must balance nature and quality of intrusion
into individual's Fourth Amendment interests and importance of governmental interests
alleged to justify intrusion if Fourth Amendment interest at stake); see also Kevin A.
Lantz, Note, Search and Seizure: The Princess and the Rock, Minnesota Declines to Extend
Plain View to Plain Feel, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 539, 560 (1993) (outlining process for bal-
ancing individual interests against societal or governmental interests when determining
reasonableness of intrusion).
107 See United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 421 (2d Cir. 1981). The Ocampo court
explained:
Where the contents of a container are easily discernible by frisking the exterior of a
package, there is little likelihood that the owner could reasonably expect any substan-
tial degree of privacy. Under such circumstances it would be a pointless formality to
require that the agents first obtain a warrant before examining the contents.
Id.; see also Haselkorn, supra note 102, at 695 (providing where officers feel object in course
of legitimate police conduct, and this provides probable cause for further search and
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1. The De Minimis Cost to the Individual
The plain touch doctrine is supported because a brief touching is
a minimal intrusion into one's privacy as compared to the benefit,
which in most instances, is an enhanced truth-finding process.' 8
The validity of this theory is analogous to the Terry search.109 In
Terry v. Ohio,110 the issue was whether law enforcement officers
could momentarily detain an individual, and perform a brief frisk
to ensure the safety of the officers, if there was reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity."' The Terry Court concluded that the
brief search of an individual was a petty indignity which was justi-
fiable to further the interest of effective law enforcement." 2
Despite the holding in Terry, this rationale is not a sound basis
on which to create a plain touch doctrine. First, the cost or incon-
venience to the citizen is greater because the search is more intru-
sive."i1 In Terry, while the intrusion was a pat-down to if the indi-
vidual was in possession of a weapon, 1 4 a more intrusive search
would be necessary to determine if illegal contraband is pres-
ent. 1 5 While only a brief feel would be necessary to determine if
an individual possessed a weapon, a person's pockets would have
to be manipulated to discover if any contraband was possessed by
seizure, further intrusion need not be authorized by warrant); Holtz, supra note 102, at 529
(arguing that it does not matter whether probable cause flows from an officers sense of
sight, touch, or some other sense); Iverson, supra note 102, at 109 (arguing probable cause
established no information leading to conclusion perceived).
108 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing cost to individual minimal
compared to benefit of enhanced fact-finding process).
109 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1967). A search was permitted to allow an officer to
discern if an individual possessed any weapons which would put the officer's life in risk. Id.
110 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
111 Id. at 5-12. Two men were observed by a police officer walking back and forth past a
store window, as if they were preparing to burglarize the establishment. Id. Later, a third
man arrived at the scene and proceeded to do the same. Id. Suspecting that the men were
planning a robbery, the officer followed them until they stopped and rejoined the third
man. Id. The officer approached the trio, asked for identification, at which time the officer
frisked the defendant for weapons. Id.
112 Id. at 10. The Terry Court stated: "In this context we approach the issues in this case
mindful of the limitations of the judicial function in controlling the myriad daily situations
in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street." Id.
113 See supra note 107 (discussing plain touch doctrine).
114 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 (police officer frisked defendant after suspecting that de-
fendant intended to commit robbery).
115 See Haselkorn, supra note 102, at 694 (arguing that sense of touch open to more
interpretations); Holtz, supra note 102, at 536 (feeling for weapon is far less intrusive than
attempting to ascertain if contraband present); Lantz, supra 106, at 545 (discerning if con-
traband present in individual's pocket could require kneading and rubbing which is far
more intrusive).
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the detainee.1 16
2. The Escalation of a Lawful Touching to Probable Cause
An alternative approach provides that probable cause arises if a
lawful touching occurs and an officer with reasonable certainty,
determines that illegal narcotics exist. 1 7 However, the initial
touching must be lawful.1 8 This scenario would occur most com-
monly during a Terry pat-down search, where an officer entertains
reasonable suspicion of criminality." 9
The second requirement would be that, during the touching, the
officer discerned with reasonable certainty that contraband ex-
isted.120 However, this requirement has been criticized.1 2 While,
it has been argued that the sense of touch is less reliable than the
sense of sight, courts could make a factual determination by con-
sidering the officer's experience.' 22 This factor, along with the use
116 See State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992) ("It is quite something else
to pinch, squeeze and rub the suspect's pocket to see what might be inside."); State v.
Rhoades, 788 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Okla. 1990) (approving use of evidence of offense unrelated
to weapons would invite use of weapons' searches as pretext for unwarranted searches);
Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 621 (Pa. 1991) (plain view doctrine associated
with seizures not searches, and to create plain touch doctrine for searches yields another
erosion to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement). But see United States v. Williams,
822 F.2d 1174, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Williams Court explained that the plain touch
exception only applies where an officer is legally authorized to touch the container in the
first place. Id. The officer must occupy a vantage point from which his observation is made
which cannot rely upon plain touch as justification for the search. Id. The Court also noted
that the doctrine sanctioned any use of the sense of touch beyond that justified by the
initial contact with the container. Id.
117 See supra note 107 (discussing lawful touching could result in ripening of probable
cause).
118 Cf Williams, 822 F.2d at 1184 (plain touch only applies where officer legally author-
ized to touch container in first place); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 428 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (initial stop and frisk justified after identity of defendant became known as indi-
vidual who had just completed cocaine purchase); Walker v. State, 610 A.2d 728, 728 (Del.
1991) (defendant's flight and character as drug dealer gave necessary fear for police officers
to perform frisk in order to discern if weapons present).119 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (explaining police officer may perform cur-
sory frisk of individual if believed that life in danger and criminality present).
120 Id. at 1184 (contents of package not deemed in plain view unless lawful touching
convinces officer to reasonable certainty that container holds contraband or evidence of
crime); see also United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (contents in
question immediately apparent upon lawful touching); Ocampo, 650 F.2d at 428 (contents
of container easily discernible by frisking exterior of package).
121 See infra note 122 (discussing sense of touch less reliable than sense of sight and
therefore open to more interpretations).
122 See State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992) (deciding sense of touch
inherently less immediate and reliable than sense of sight and therefore declined to extend
plain view doctrine to sense of touch); Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa.
1991) (stating amount of drugs on defendant so minute that impossible to identify through
sense of touch).
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of hindsight to determine if the object could have been discerned
with reasonable certainty, would support a police officer's
search. 123
A majority of states, including New York, have refused to adopt
the plain touch doctrine. 1 24 New York, however, should adopt the
plain touch doctrine because probable cause may arise after a po-
lice officer has made a lawful touching. Although at inception
probable cause may not exist, if an officer makes a legal touching
based on reasonable suspicion and discerns that contraband ex-
ists, probable cause would be established.
B. The Good Faith Exception
In United States v. Leon,'25 the Supreme Court established the
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. 126 The Leon Court
explained that when a police officer acted in good faith, and with
reasonable reliance upon a defective warrant, evidence obtained
would not be excluded. 127 Similar to the plain touch doctrine, the
good faith exception has been criticized.' 28 Some commentators
believe that courts should not penalize an officer, who acted in
"good faith," since the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
123 See supra note 120 (court could make factual determination by considering if officer
could discern object with reasonable certainty).
124 See, e.g., State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 85 (Ariz. 1983) (to approve use of evidence of
some offense unrelated to weapons would invite use of weapons' searches as pretext for
unwarranted searches, and thus, severely erode protection of Fourth Amendment); Dunn v.
State, 382 So. 2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1980) (expressly limiting Terry rationale to language);
Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 845 (court contends sense of touch inherently less reliable than
sight); State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Okla. 1990) (confining scope of Terry to offen-
sive weapons); Marconi, 597 A.2d at 631 (noting plain view associated with seizures and
not searches); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 100 (Wash. 1982) (search violates guarantee
of Fourth Amendment, which protects persons against unreasonable intrusions on part of
all governmental agents).
125 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
126 Id. at 922 (stating exclusionary rule never intended to be absolute and if its pur-
pose-to deter police misconduct-would not be furthered, it should not be used).
127 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (explaining that primary purpose of exclusionary rule is to
deter police misconduct, and therefore, no need to exclude evidence when police officer ac-
ted in good faith upon defective warrant, because then there is no conduct to deter).
128 See 2 LAFAvE, supra note 27, at § 1.3. In support of his argument against the good
faith doctrine, Professor LaFave stated: "[W]e have not been treated to an honest assess-
ment of the merits of the exclusionary rule, but instead have been drawn into a curious
world where the 'costs' of excluding illegally obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights
and where the 'benefits' of such exclusion are made to disappear with a mere wave of the
hand." Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)). But see Rosemarie A. Lynskey, A Middle Ground Approach to the Exclusionary Rem-
edy: Reconciling the Reduction Doctrine with United States v. Leon, 41 VAND. L. REV. 811,
824 (1988). The author stated that the good faith exception is moot because the threshold
for probable cause was diminished after Gates. Id.
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police misconduct. 129 Other critics argue that an officer would be
tempted to ignore the validity of a warrant if the officer knew that
acting in good faith would be a sufficient basis for admitting any
evidence discovered.
130
Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White stated that the
cost of having evidence excluded should be balanced against the
benefit of having such evidence included. 1 3 1 Specifically, the cost
of losing valuable evidence which hinders the truth-finding pro-
cess as compared to the benefit of discouraging police misconduct.
Justice White explained that in the case where a law enforcement
officer acted in good faith while executing a warrant, the validity
of the warrant was irrelevant, and the benefits of admitting the
evidence outweighed the costs. 132 Justice White reasoned that
since the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police mis-
conduct, there was no misconduct to deter if an officer acted in
good faith, and thus the evidence should be admitted.
133
This rationale is flawed because to admit unlawfully seized evi-
dence, in order to aid in the truth-finding process, would make the
"judiciary become a part of what is in fact a single governmental
action prohibited by the terms of the [Fourth] [A]mendment."1 3
4
Additionally, the good faith exception overlooks a type of conduct
sought to be deterred. If an officer knows that so long as he acts in
good faith upon a warrant, that any evidence discovered will not
129 See supra note 127 (discussing no conduct to deter if officer acts in good faith).
130 See id.
131 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909-10 (1984). The Leon Court stated: "[I]t
does not follow from the emphasis on the exclusionary rule's deterrent value that 'anything
which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment.'" Id. (quot-
ing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). The Court went further and
explained that sometimes benefits to persons aggrieved by the introduction of damaging
evidence unlawfully obtained would not outweigh its costs. Id. (citing Alderman, 394 U.S.
at 174-75).
132 Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (explaining validity of warrant plays no part in officers execu-
tion of it, rather officers good faith should be commended rather than condemned).
133 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. The Court explained that it would be the magistrate's duty
to decide whether probable cause existed. Id. Once an officer receives the warrant, there is
really no opportunity to question the magistrate's findings. Id. The only real duty is to
execute the warrant. Id. Furthermore, Justice White explained that cases had consistently
held that when the exclusionary rule was rigidly applied, the result was to hinder the
truth-finding process. Id.
134 Id. at 933. The Leon Court stated:
[lt is difficult to give any meaning at all to the limitations imposed by the [Fourth]
Amendment if they are read to proscribe only certain conduct by the police but to allow
other agents of the same government to take advantage of evidence secured by the
police in violation of its requirement.
Id. at 933-34.
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be suppressed, the warrant's soundness is irrelevant, and the of-
ficer will fail to obtain valid warrants.
1 35
Since the Leon decision in 1984, eleven states, including New
York, have rejected the good faith exception, 13 while twelve
states have adopted the Leon holding.137 The remaining states
have either refused to decide this issue,13 1 or have failed to un-
equivocally accept or reject the Leon rationale. 139 These remaining
states should apply New York's more prudent approach and reject
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
C. The Existence of Reasonable Suspicion
In People v. DeBour,14 0 the New York Court of Appeals defined
police conduct that would be appropriate in response to different
situations arising during an officers' course of duty. 14 1 The
DeBour court adopted the Terry rationale, and held that if a police
officer entertained a reasonable suspicion that a particular person
was involved in criminal activity, he could detain the individual,
and briefly frisk the person if the officer felt that he was in physi-
135 See supra note 128 (discussing misconduct sought to be deterred was having officer
seek valid warrant rather than being unconcerned with soundness).
136 See People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 488 N.E.2d 451, 454, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630,
633 (1985); see also State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 58 (Conn. 1990); Gary v. State, 422
S.E.2d 428,29 (Ga. 1992); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 661 (Ind. 1992); Commonwealth
v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 554, 557 (Mass. 1985); People v. Sudling, 395 N.W.2d 308, 315 (Mich.
1986); State v. Gutierrez, 819 P.2d 1332, 1333 (N.M. 1991); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553,
554 (N.C. 1988); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. 1991); State v. Oakes,
598 A.2d 119, 120 (Vt. 1991).
137 See, e.g., McFarland v. State, 684 S.W.2d 233, 243 (Ark. 1985); People v. Deitchman,
695 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Colo. 1985); People v. Stewart, 473 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (Ill. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985); Balock v. State, 483 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. 1985); State v.
Doile, 769 P.2d 666, 672 (Kan. 1989); State v. Ebey, 491 So. 2d 498, 500 (La. Ct. App. 1986);
Chase v. State, 522 A.2d 1348, 1359 (Md. 1987); State v. Parmar, 437 N.W.2d 503, 504
(Neb. 1989); State v. George, 544 N.E.2d 640, 643 (Ohio 1989); State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d
825, 828 (S.D. 1988); Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
138 See State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Mo. 1985); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d
415, 422 (Utah 1991).
139 See, e.g., Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242, 254 (Del. 1987); State v. Diamond, 628 A.2d
1032, 1034 (Me. 1993); Solis-Avila v. State, 830 P.2d 191, 192 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
140 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976).
141 Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 574, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 386. The Debour court stated:
[V]arious intensities of police action are justifiable as the precipitating and attendant
factors increase in weight and competence .... Where a police officer entertains a rea-
sonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing or is about to
commit a felony or misdemeanor, the CPL authorizes a forcible stop and detention of
that person. A corollary of the statutory right to temporarily detain for questioning is
the authority to frisk if the officer reasonably suspects that he is danger of physical
injury by virtue of the detainee being armed.
Id.
1993] CONTROVERSY OVER EXCLUSIONARY RULE 217
cal danger. 142 Although Terry established this test, inconsisten-
cies exist in the New York courts as to what constitutes reason-
able suspicion.
In People v. Cantor,'43 the New York Court of Appeals defined
reasonable suspicion as the "quantum of knowledge sufficient to
induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the cir-
cumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand."144 The first
element necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is the "quan-
tum of knowledge." 145 The court must review the quantity or
amount of the police officer's knowledge present at the time of the
street encounter. 4 6 This knowledge could be an awareness of be-
ing in a drug prone neighborhood, or observation of a person in
flight. 147 While each factor may not be conclusive by itself, the
courts should be mindful of the aggregate of factors.
The second element requires the court to determine how an or-
dinarily prudent and cautious person would perceive the circum-
stances. 148 Although a reasonable person test is applied, courts
should recognize that police officers have a greater exposure to
everyday street encounters, and their perception towards a situa-
tion may be different than that of an ordinarily prudent person. 149
142 Id. (intrusion by brief search minimal compared to benefit received by allowing police
officer to ensure his safety).
143 36 N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1975).
144 Id. at 108, 324 N.E.2d at 874, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 511. In order for the courts to approve
a police officer's suspicion that criminality was at hand, a police officer must indicate spe-
cific facts, which, along with any logical dqduction, would reasonably prompt an intrusion
into an individuals privacy. Id. Good faith and "mere hunches" will not suffice. Id. at 113,
324 N.E.2d at 877, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
145 Id. at 112-13, 324 N.E.2d at 879, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (describing quantity of knowl-
edge measured in deciding if officer had reasonable suspicion).
146 See Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d at 113, 324 N.E.2d at 880, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 515. The Cantor
court concluded that there was no evidence in the record which indicated that the officers
had knowledge of criminal activity. Id. The court noted there was no independent knowl-
edge from an informer to indicate a crime had been committed, nor were there any observa-
tion of defendant participating in any criminal act. Id.; see also People v. Adams, 194
A.D.2d 102, 105, 605 N.Y.S.2d 120, 123 (3d Dep't 1993) (explaining officer had sufficient
knowledge to fulfill need for reasonable because defendant's vehicle was reported stolen);
People v. Williams, 603 N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (2d Dep't 1993) (revealing that back up officers
justifiably relied on radio transmissions of fellow officers describing seller, which resulted
in reasonable suspicion).
147 See supra note 146 (discussing situation where officer had articuable facts and
knowledge to support reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot).
148 See People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 108, 111, 324 N.E.2d 872, 874, 365 N.Y.S.2d
509, 511 (1975).
149 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1967) (police should be given great deference in
their evaluation of street encounters because officer's knowledge differs from that of lay
person); People v. Gray, 90 A.D.2d 405, 406, 457 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (stating eight and one-
half years of experience enabled officer to believe that criminal activity was afoot); see also
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Greater deference should therefore be given to a law enforcement
officer's perception, and a revised ordinarily prudent person test
should be used.150
CONCLUSION
No one search and seizure is ever identical to another. Like-
wise, an officer's conduct in executing a warrant is never the
same. Since the utilization of the exclusionary rule will always be
fact-specific, it seems difficult to imagine there ever being a
bright-line test for the courts to adopt. However, the adoption of
the plain touch doctrine and a clarified definition of reasonable
suspicion will move New York courts to a fairer and clearer utili-
zation of the exclusionary rule, while preserving the purpose of
deterring police misconduct.
Susan Delaney & Matthew Woitkowski
State v. DeMeter, 590 A.2d 1179, 1182-83 (1991). The DeMeter court recognized that in
some situations a police officer may have particular training or experience that would en-
able him to infer criminal activity in circumstances where an ordinary observer would not.
Id.
150 See supra note 146 (stating that police officer's experience is unique quality and, ac-
cordingly, should be given great deference).
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